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BOOK REVIEW
By David Fogel.1 Cincinnati, Ohio:
The W. H. Anderson Co. 1975. Pp. xxi, 328. $9.50.
".. . WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF.. ."

2
Reviewed by FredericL. Faust

As crime rates in the United States continue to climb-despite
massive. federal, state, and local efforts to curb the trend-it is understandable that citizens, special interest groups, political leaders, and
criminal justice professionals alike should become increasingly disenchanted with the prevailing system of criminal correction. The
system's failure to control recidivism among convicted offenders is
evident to even the most casual observer. Somewhat less apparent is
the growing body of empirical evidence indicating that certain accepted policies and procedures followed by criminal justice agencies
may be significant factors in causing recidivism. Central among these
factors are the exercise of broad judicial discretion in sentencing, the
tolerance of degrading conditions and inhumane practices, and the
application of arbitrary criteria to parole decisions. While David
Fogel's study focuses largely upon these particular shortcomings of
contemporary corrections, the "justice model" he offers has implications for all aspects of correctional administration. In fact, it is inconceivable that the justice model for corrections, as presented in this
book, could be effectively implemented without substantial policy and
operational changes in all criminal justice agencies. As the author
puts it,

[m]y charge was to develop an elaboration of what I have called
the "justice model" of prison administration. It rests on the notion
that justice-as fairness-is the pursuit we should be involved with
in prison rather than the several treatment models to which we
have given lip service in the past. My thesis is that the best way to
teach non-law-abiders to be law-abiding is to treat them lawfully.
My concern is less with the administration of justice and more . . .
with the justice of administration (p. xv).

Thus, while taking the prison as the medium of proof for his argument, Fogel designs not a new technique for offender treatment, but
rather a model for rehabilitating the existing correctional system
(with critical implications for the total system of criminal justice).
1. Executive Director, Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. Formerly Superintendent, Marin County (California) Juvenile Hall; Chairman, Department of Sociology,
Laney College; and Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Corrections.
2. Associate Professor, School of Criminology, Florida State University.
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In the opening chapter, Fogel lays the foundation for his thesis
with an historical account of how the "fortress prison" reached its
present inglorious position in American corrections and shows how
the correctional system as a whole has achieved its current state of
turmoil. His analysis reflects a fairly balanced synthesis of the
"economic-deterministic perspective ' '3 and the "social order interpretation ' ' 4 of relevant historical events. That is, he views the precolonial
correctional practices of forced labor and transportation in terms of
economic needs associated with the growth of mercantilism and the
great land discoveries in the western hemisphere. Similarly, the history
of American prison labor is presented in relation to economic demands
and resulting shifts in marketing systems.
Contrastingly, Fogel attributes the emergence of the fortress prison
in the early nineteenth century to social order objectives. As Fogel
tells it, the massive influx of poor immigrants with strange cultural
patterns and the resulting explosion of vice and corruption in the
slums of rapidly growing urban centers were perceived as posing a severe
threat to the established American value system and life style. The
prison with its strict regimen of productive labor, moral training, and
insulation from corruptive influences was designed to serve as the
model for other social institutions (colleges, boarding schools,
children's homes, and even large families) to follow in the struggle
to preserve social stability and protect the values of the Jacksonian
era. It was believed that this model's success with society's most aberrant
members would clearly demonstrate its merit as the most expedient path
to saving the nation.
Discussing the adoption of large maximum-security prisons as the
preferred correctional approach (despite the failure of such institutions
to realize their social order objectives), the historical account is
necessarily brought to focus upon policies and practices of prison administration. Fogel traces the transition in penal policy from the repressive and brutal measures of the mid-1800's, through a period of
humanistic reform in the late 1800's and early 1900's, to the era of the
"rehabilitative model" that extends to the present. This interpretive
review is concise and perceptive. It does not deal in depth with the
conflicting philosophical tenets of the classical and positivistic schools
of criminology. However, Fogel weaves the correctional concepts of
punishment/deterrence and treatment/rehabilitation into his chronicle
. 3.

G.

On the history of corrections from the perspective of economic-determinism, see
KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRuCruRE (1939).
On the emergence of the prison in America from the social order perspective, see

RUScHE & 0.

4.

D. ROTHMAN, THE DIscovERY OF THE ASYLUM 79-108

(1971).

1976]

BOOK REVIEW

of events, conditions, and beliefs; moreover, some of the critical issues
raised by the interface of these philosophical positions are made apparent in the discussion of the emergence of the rehabilitation model.
The attention Fogel directs on the historical transition in offender
status in American corrections is of particular significance. He approaches his analysis of correctional policies and practices in much
the same manner that Dinitz, Dynes, and Clarke approached their study
of deviance-through the development of a status typology. 5 Fogel
points out that correctional policy and the role of prison personnel
in carrying out that policy can be interpreted as a function of the
prevailing definition of offender status:
When the offender was a pariah, the then embryonic correctional
apparatus operated as banisher, mutilator, or executioner-its least
complicated roles. After the Revolution, the offender was deemed to
be a penitent (and thus in need of a place for penitence-a penitentiary) ; the keeper became a moral guider. With the Industrial Revolution came the collapse of the solitude system of care, prayer, and
work; the offender now simply became a prisoner and the keeper a
punisher. From about the end of the Civil War, but at an accelerated
pace after the turn of this century (in response to the influx of
clinicians), rehabilitators in their need for work products (caseloads)
recast the prisoner as a patient, and the keeper became treater. Following the erosion (but not yet the demise) of the medical model,
the prisoner turned to the courts for status revision ...
...The prisoner deemed it more useful to become a plaintiff....
When the prisoner turned from patient to plaintiff, the officials
necessarily turned defendant (pp. 62-64).
The next two chapters of the book are devoted to a detailed
examination of how this transition along the pariah-penitent-prisonerpatient-plaintiff continuum has affected both the "keepers" and the
"kept." This discussion leads the reader to conclude that the correctional system's failure to effectively impact upon the crime problem
5. In laying the foundation for their study of deviance, these authors noted that,
every society defines behaviors that are to be labeled as deviant and proscribed
as undesirable. . . . [S]ome explanations or theories must be offered for the
existence and persistence of such deviant behavior in the face of negative social
sanctions. . .
[T]here would be little reason to define, sanction, and explain
deviance without also doing something to, for, or with the deviant in order to
correct, deter, prevent, and/or punish him.
S. DINrrz, R. DYNES & A. CLARKE, DEVIANcE 3 (1969). In this light, what is done to,
for, or with a deviant (e.g., banishment, punishment, treatment) may be viewed as a
function of the deviant's ascribed status (e.g., freak, sinful, criminal, sick, or alienated).
Id. at 12-21.
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is the consequence of aimlessness and chaos arising from several circumstances. In the main these are: (1) inconsistent definitions of the
purpose of criminal law; (2) the lack of understanding of human behavior and the consequent use of inadequate and frequently competing
theories and methodologies; and (3) the absence of any specific correctional purpose or objectives as a result of (1) and (2) above. The
present situation is particularly aggravated by the insecurity and
hostility (of both the keepers and the kept) attending the early uncertain stages of the offender's transition from patient to plaintiff and
the prison official's transition from rehabilitator to defendant. Thus
the current state of the correctional system is not only chaotic but also
highly explosive.
Given this picture of where we have been and where we are now,
Fogel's next step is to consider where we should be going and how best
to get there. His aim is to establish a set of principles that are general
enough to provide the correctional system with a clearly delineated
purpose and specific enough to serve as guidelines for policy decisions and operational practices that will resolve rather than simply
alleviate the current crisis. The central theme is "justice-as-fairness,"
and the approach is designed to be practical as opposed to philosophical.
As Fogel puts it, "In order to develop an operational model of justice
in corrections we must move from the philosopher's chair to the
cellblock" (p. 185). This does not, however, imply a lack of concern
for philosophical considerations, since he carefully specifies the main
assumptions of his position and refers to them frequently as he
elaborates their operational implications. The statement implies that
once he has specified these premises, Fogel does not feel the need to
argue or defend them at length.
Fogel asks the reader to take it as given that the classical (or neoclassical) free-will/punishment/deterrence philosophy, with its ideal
implications for due process in the administration of criminal justice,
forms the only meaningful foundation for penal sanctions., No claim is
made that imprisonment is an effective deterrent either generally or
6. The rehabilitative correctional purposes of treatment and resocialization are not
dismissed without argument but with brief reference to the conclusions of Tappan and
Packer that the multitude of rehabilitative theories and techniques have been inadequate
and conflicting, and that there is no demonstrable relationship between these therapeutic
or training approaches and criminal behavior. Concurring with these observations, Fogel
posits: "When corrections becomes mired in the dismal swamp of preaching, exhorting,
and treating ('resocialization') it becomes dysfunctional as an agency of justice. Correctional agencies should engage prisoners as the law otherwise dictates-as responsible,
volitional and aspiring human beings" (p. 184). See also P. TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY
CORRECTION 4-5 (1951); PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 189 (1968).
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specifically. Rather, Fogel recognizes that a prison sentence realistically
represents a deprivation of liberty for a given period of time and, as
such, must be carried out in the context of lawful administration. According to Fogel, it is this lawful administration-justice-as-fairnessthat is the fundamental purpose of all agencies of the criminal law. On
this point he notes that "[j]ustice-as-fairness is not a program; it is a
process that insists the prisons (and all agencies of the criminal law)
perform their assigned tasks with non-law-abiders lawfully. No more
should be expected, no less should be tolerated by correctional administrators" (p. 184).
Critical to the concept of justice-as-fairness is the recognition that
the prisoner is nothing more than a member of society who is being
lawfully subjected to a temporary loss of liberty. As a continuing
member of society,7 he retains all of the rights of a free citizen except
those that permit freedom of movement and freedom from the
essential constraints of mass living. The prisoner retains a right to
voluntarily choose programs and services for his own benefit and to
be free from coercion into those he does not seek. It is incumbent
upon correctional officials and staff to recognize this volition on the
part of convicted offenders and to design and conduct correctional
programs and activities with the full degree of "fairness" that such
recognition requires.
The policy implications of this perspective are presented in terms
of short-range and middle-range goals-i.e., those not requiring enabling
legislation or new appropriations, and those requiring either or both.
The short-range goal is the adoption of the concept of justice-asfairness in correctional policy and practice. The middle-range goals are:
(1) a return to flat time sentences with procedural rules in law
governing sentence selection; (2) the elimination of both parole
boards and parole agencies as we have known them; and (3) the
transformation of the fortress prison into institutions for no more
than 300 persons, further divisible into sub-units of 30 [containing
offenders sentenced to similar terms, with release being determined
by] a narrow and reviewable system of vested good-time rules (p. 204).
Fogel emphasizes that long-range goals are not specified, quite intentionally, in order to avoid detracting from the urgency of immediate change. Nonetheless, the complete demise of the fortress
prison is recognized as a long-term process, even though it is suggested
7.

On the concept of the prisoner as a continuing member of society, see CANADIAN
ON CORRECTION, THE BAsIc PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

COMMITTEE

(1969).
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as an immediate policy provision to be implemented as a middle-range
goal.
In order to realize these objectives, Fogel offers a number of
specific proposals which he elaborates in terms of "micro-world"
(within prison) and "macro-world" (outside of prison) categories. For
the micro-world he advocates the following:
(1) a system of inmate-staff governance;
(2) a formal grievance procedure for conflict resolution;
(3) the provision of legal advice to prisoners in dealing with conditions of confinement and civil matters (e.g., divorce, protection of
property), as well as post-conviction appeals;
(4) a tight set of procedural rules to limit (though not eliminate)
discretion and insure "fairness" in administrative decision making;
and
(5) the appointment of ombudsmen to monitor prison practices
and conditions and maintain open lines of communication between
prisoners and administrators.
Proposals with regard to the macro-world call for:
(1) a system of victim compensation that would have the effect
of keeping more offenders out of prison by keeping them employed in
the community in order to repay victims;
(2) a substantial restriction of sentencing discretion through
statutorily required sentencing criteria and procedures for sentence
review;
(3) more extensive use of alternatives to imprisonment and the
requirement of a finding that the offender presents a clear and present
danger to society as a prerequisite for incarceration;
(4) the establishment of a "flat time" sentencing structure (allowing a very narrow range of flexibility for mitigating or aggravating
circumstances) with provision for "good time" credit; and
(5) the abolition of parole.
The combination of short- and long-term and micro- and macroworld proposals is intended to form an integrated system which the
author argues must be taken as a whole. In his view, "the parts of the
justice model must operate together if the result is to be a process
of justice-as-fairness. Anything less runs the risk of being an obstruction of this process" (pp. 274-75). The dangers of piecemeal implementation are several. The adoption of selected procedures (e.g.,
inmate-staff governance and formal grievance procedures), taken out
of the context of the total model, could simply serve to conceal existing
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oppressive practices by giving them an aura of legitimacy. Similarly,
there is the probability that flat time sentencing policies and the
abolition of parole, taken separately, would result in longer and more
frequent prison sentences than are currently being imposed. The adoption of the micro-world proposals in the absence of the macro-world
changes could well facilitate a prostitution of the model's fundamental
purposes and result in its becoming simply another technique for the
"treatment" of prisoners.
These are indeed legitimate concerns, since any sudden and total
commitment to such a drastically different approach in American
corrections is most unlikely to occur. Therefore, the author realistically
backs away from an all-or-nothing requisite for the implementation
of his model and interprets these operational risks as dangers to be
recognized and avoided in the process of change. The fact that such
critical risks in implementation are immediately apparent and clearly
elaborated is at once a strength of the author's practical approach and
a weakness of the model-a weakness that is common to social reform
approaches that call for fundamental and sweeping changes in
established social institutions. However, the signal attention that Fogel
directs to these problems helps to place them more in the realm of
major hazards than insurmountable obstacles.
Overall, Fogel has set for himself the task of delineating a clear
purpose for the correctional system and a set of guidelines for achieving
that purpose by creating "a vision about what we are now and what
we wish to become, coupled with a strategy to help get us there" (p.
282). Unquestionably he accomplishes this task. His analysis of the
current correctional system is perceptive and candid. In addition, his
specification of "justice-as-fairness" as the fundamental purpose of all
agencies of the criminal law is clear and certain, and his proposed
strategy for realizing this objective is sufficiently elaborated to serve as
an unambiguous guide for practical implementation. Granted, he does
not lay out detailed directions for implementing the model, but this
is by design rather than default since it would not be possible within
the scope of his study to accurately account for the conditions and resources of all the individual states. Nonetheless, the principles essential
for developing detailed plans and carrying out specific activities are
provided.
It seems unlikely that the author's central theme of "justice-as-fairness" will meet with any significant degree of informed opposition. At
the same time, his condemnation of offender treatment approaches and
his denial of offender rehabilitation as a correctional goal of equal
standing with justice may result in the model's being rejected out-of-
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hand by a number of persons in the so-called "helping professions."
This would indeed be unfortunate. Acceptance of the justice model
does not require cessation of the quest for deterministic explanations
of human behavior, nor does it preclude the use of knowledge derived
from this quest in attempts to help convicted offenders resolve their
individual problems in socially acceptable ways. 8 What is required is
the preservation of human dignity and the elimination of coercive
"treatment" that relies upon the prisoners' hopes and fears with respect
to the consequences of their behavior. Scientific knowledge of human
behavior in general, and criminal behavior in particular, is not
presently sufficient to bring about the effective rehabilitation of
offenders. While this may not always be so, the argument for the
priority of "fairness" in contemporary correctional policy and practice
is a cogent one. Further, justice-as-fairness could well turn out to be
the first essential step in the process of individual offender rehabilitation. 9
Fogel's work is not presented as a panacea for all the ills of the
existing correctional system, nor should it be heralded as such. It is,
however, an important contribution and may be expected to have a
significant impact on the future development of correctional policy and
practice in the United States.
8. While the proposed system is built upon a classical view of man as a rational
and volitional being, its practical construction does not necessitate the denial of
deterministic influences on behavior. From a practical perspective it is reasonable to
conceive of determinism and free will as positions on a continuum ranging from
scientific knowledge to ignorance of the causes of human behavior. In this sense, the
deterministic extreme is characterized by scientifically verified knowledge, while
the free will extreme is a reflection of scientific ignorance, with an area of experimentation separating the two extremes. Correctional policy and practice, then, may be described in terms of movement back and forth along the continuum from knowledge,
through experimentation, to ignorance. Thus, when scientific ignorance abounds, but
the necessity for coping with aberrant behavior remains, the tendency to fall back
upon free will, punishment, and deterrence is not only understandable but necessary.
Under all conditions the principles of humaneness and fairness must be recognized as
the foundation for the administration of justice. See Faust, A Perspective on the Dilemma
of Free Will and Determinism in Juvenile Justice, 25 JUVENILE JUSTICE, May 1974, at 54.
9. On the development of this notion, pertaining to the field of juvenile justice, see
Justice Douglas's quote from a Rhode Island Family Court decision, In re McCloud,
quoted in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 562 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

